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Research summary  
 
This paper emphasises the social and political dimensions of subsidiary influence in strategically 
repositioning the subsidiary’s mandate. The specific skills subsidiary actors deploy in attempting 
to influence corporate headquarters have largely been neglected in existing literature. Drawing 
from a micro-political perspective, we provide a more nuanced, fine-grained understanding of 
subsidiary influence by illuminating how influence is augmented and enriched through the 
concomitant effects of subsidiary actors’ social and political skills. Using a multiple case study 
analysis, drawing on qualitative interviews, we illustrate how subsidiary actors’ social skills are used 
to continuously create, maintain and develop spaces of social engagement with corporate decision 
makers, whereas political skill involves the ability to leverage social spaces by developing specific 
influence tactics such as targeting, showcasing and framing.  
 
Managerial summary  
 
Subsidiaries of multinational companies play an increasingly dominant role in the global business 
environment. The role of the individual subsidiary actor in influencing corporate management is 
crucial to the development of the subsidiary mandate. Despite this, very little is known about the 
micro-level skills that individual subsidiary actors draw upon to influence the development of their 
mandates. This paper explores how subsidiary actors channel key social and political skills in 
strategically repositioning their mandates within the multinational enterprise. We find that 
subsidiary actors may use their social skill to establish increased interaction and communication 





Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are characterised by continually shifting structures, often driven 
by global and local conflicts of power between corporate headquarters (HQ) and foreign 
subsidiaries (Ambos, Asakawa and Ambos, 2011; Clegg, Geppert and Hollinshead, 2018; Geppert, 
Becker-Ritterspach and Mudambi, 2016). The corporate HQ’s aspiration to exert greater control 
and coordination is continuously countered or challenged by the subsidiary’s interest in achieving 
auxiliary levels of autonomy and influence (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016; Forsgren, 
Holm and Johanson, 2005; Narula, 2014). Contemporary changes in MNE structural design, from 
hierarchical to network-based architectures, create opportunities and challenges for a subsidiary’s 
mandate, which manifest in investment or relocation decisions (Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 
2007). This is a strategic problem for subsidiaries, in that subsidiary actors that are not seeking to 
consistently develop influence over their corporate HQ during these changes may risk mandate 
divestment or strategic isolation (Monteiro, Arvidsson and Birkinshaw, 2008). Despite extant 
research acknowledging that the position of the subsidiary is largely dependent on the influence it 
cultivates over corporate HQ (Asakawa et al. 2017; Conroy and Collings, 2016; Garcia-Pont, 
Canales and Noboa, 2009; Yamin and Andersson, 2011) our understanding of the specific 
mechanisms through which key actors in the subsidiary gain and maintain influence over the 
corporate HQ during mandate change remains limited. As such, greater consideration of subsidiary 
influence as a continuous activity that is frequently contested over time, rather than incidentally 
established in defined periods of bargaining or negotiation is an important focus (Dorrenbacher 
and Gammelgaard, 2006; Najafi-Tavani, Giroud and Andersson, 2014). 
 
Taking the perspective of the MNE as a political arena captures a central problem for subsidiaries, 
in that any influence the subsidiary develops is continuously in flux and not easily sustained, as 
other powerful and influential actors attempt to cultivate favourable positions of their own (Clegg 
et al. 2018). Recent research has argued that the architectural shift from hierarchical to a network-
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based MNE has set the scene for a ‘high-stakes’ political contestation between corporate HQ and 
foreign subsidiaries in a bid to preserve or develop influence (Egelhoff and Wolf, 2017; Levy and 
Reiche, 2017). More specifically, MNEs are populated by individual actors who have diverse 
political objectives, formed through a multitude of social interactions (Harvey and Novecevic, 
2004; Kostova and Roth, 2003; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). In this sense, the concept of 
subsidiary influence has remained largely ‘face-less’ in explaining how significant transitional 
exchanges in the corporate HQ-subsidiary relationship represent a global political game, 
dominated by ongoing micro-level interactions from key actors at the subsidiary level (O’Brien et 
al. 2018; Forsgren et al. 2005; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). In particular, shifting structures in the 
form of mandate change create ‘contested social spaces’ within the MNE leading to increasingly 
intense social and political interactions between powerful actors seeking to establish greater 
influence (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016; Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014). These social 
and political interactions create further opportunities for individual actors to leverage and channel 
particular skills within changing social hierarchies over time (Cullen, Gerbasi, and Chrobot-Mason, 
2015; Levy and Reiche, 2017). We argue that in order to create a more nuanced and granular 
explanation of subsidiary influence, independent from the formal resources the subsidiary 
possesses and structures it operates in, we need to explore the social and political undertakings of 
key subsidiary actors in the context of mandate change. Drawing on the micro-political lens of the 
corporate HQ-subsidiary relationship (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006, 2016; Geppert and 
Dorrenbacher, 2014; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006), we explore how 
subsidiary actors use their social and political skills to augment and enrich subsidiary influence in 
the context of mandate change?  
 
The main contribution of our study lies in identifying the specific mechanisms through which key 
actors in the subsidiary gain and maintain influence over the corporate HQ during mandate change. 
Our findings illuminate how the concomitant effects of social skill and political skill are important 
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to augment and enrich influence in the context of strategically repositioning the subsidiary’s 
mandate within the MNE. Subsidiary actors leverage social skill in order to continuously create, 
maintain and develop spaces of social engagement with key decision makers, whereas political skill 
enables the leveraging of social spaces by developing specific influence tactics. A major 
contribution of our study comes in the form of a typology of subsidiary actor influence roles that 
explicates how various roles are defined by the degree of social navigating and political 
manoeuvring that subsidiary actors undertake. We provide a more nuanced micro-level 
understanding of subsidiary influence, by illuminating the importance of the social and political 
dimensions of subsidiary influence (Kostova and Roth, 2003; Levy and Reiche, 2017). Drawing on 
the micro-political perspective of the MNE we answer calls to explore how influence is augmented 
and enriched in the socio-political dynamics that are ground in micro-level interactions between 
key actors in the corporate HQ-subsidiary relationship (Clegg et al. 2018; Dorrenbacher and 
Gammelgaard, 2016; Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014). The paper is structured as follows. After 
detailing the theoretical background, we introduce the qualitative nature of the methodology. Our 
findings are subsequently presented before a conclusion of the main contributions of the research. 
 
SUBSIDIARY INFLUENCE FOR MANDATE CHANGE  
Traditionally, the MNE hierarchy is conceptualised with power as a centralised concept, in that 
corporate HQ controls subsidiary operations through the allocation of formal resources or 
implementation of normative integration mechanisms (Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012; Kostova, 
Marano and Tallman, 2016). The networked perspective of the MNE focuses on the increasingly 
differentiated nature of subsidiary operations and their ability to independently acquire and 
develop mandates (Andersson et al. 2007; Narula, 2014). In this networked context, influence is a 
reciprocal process as the subsidiary is not only affected by corporate HQ, but it in turn also affects 
the behaviour of corporate decision makers (Forsgren et al. 2005; Pla-Barber, Villar and Madhok, 
2017). The position of the subsidiary in particular is largely determined by the role they enact or 
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the legal mandate they possess from corporate HQ, with more significant mandates translating to 
greater subsidiary influence (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a). Mandates may be defined as tasks 
assigned to subsidiaries, or responsibilities acquired independently, as the corporate HQ creates a 
division of labour and controls the degree of decision making autonomy each subsidiary possesses 
(Birkinshaw, 1996; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). These tasks or responsibilities may be related 
to a product, market or value-added scope in existing or new functions for the subsidiary 
(Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006). Extant research details the various types of subsidiary 
mandates or ‘charters’ (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Galunic 
and Eisenhardt, 1996) and more recently explores how subsidiaries develop or manage the 
evolution of their mandates (Andersson et al. 2007; Cavanagh et al. 2017; Dorrenbacher and 
Gammelgaard, 2016; Mudambi, Pedersen and Andersson, 2014; Tippmann et al. 2018). All of these 
studies recognise that subsidiaries have to be cognisant of the control and power corporate HQ 
has over their ability to influence and ‘upgrade’ to a more advanced mandate than initially allocated 
(Asakawa et al. 2017; Burger et al. 2017; Garcia-Pont et al. 2009).  
 
MNEs may display elements of both hierarchical and network-based structures, particularly during 
structural change and this creates further complexities for subsidiaries in gaining and maintaining 
influence (Ambos et al. 2011; Clegg et al. 2018; Egelhoff and Wolf, 2017; Forsgren et al. 2005). As 
such, we argue that subsidiary mandates are more fluid than current theorising acknowledges. They 
can be developed or divested depending on internal and external changes that affect the overall 
corporate structure (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a), such as 
responses to changing customer preferences, changes in CEO or acquisitions. Despite these 
changes, the challenge for the subsidiary is that it is expected to maintain its mandate in accordance 
with the corporate strategy, as corporate executives hold the overall power (Asakawa et al. 2017; 
Yamin and Andersson, 2011). As such, a strategic problem for subsidiaries involves the 
maintenance of an influential relationship with corporate HQ in the context of growing complexity 
7 
 
throughout the MNE network, which creates significant variability in their mandates (Conroy and 
Collings, 2016). Extant research has largely failed to address the ways in which subsidiary actors 
continuously negotiate and improve their often ambiguous and fluctuating mandate positions 
(Alfoldi, McGaughey and Clegg 2017; Burger et al. 2017). The possession of a specific mandate or 
resource may ensure a prominent role for the subsidiary but certainly will not guarantee influence 
over time, given that the interests of key corporate actors and MNE structures are continuously 
changing (Levy and Reiche, 2017). As such, we define subsidiary influence broadly as the ability to 
affect the strategic decision making of corporate HQ. 
 
A major criticism of current research on subsidiary influence is that it fails to consider how the 
micro-level interactions that produce interconnected relationships between key actors create more 
nuanced and informal forms of subsidiary influence (Forsgren et al. 2005; Geppert and 
Dorrenbacher, 2014). Micro-level interactions in a networked structure may be important for 
informing increasingly distanced and rationally bounded corporate executives of the activities the 
subsidiary actors are involved in (Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2011; Menz, Kunisch and Collis, 
2015). Subsidiaries may need to consistently convince corporate HQ of the legitimacy of their 
activities as the more knowledge corporate executives have about these activities the more likely 
the subsidiary will be perceived as transparent and trustworthy (Asakawa et al. 2017; Conroy and 
Collings, 2016). As such, keeping corporate HQ informed is clearly an important part of a 
subsidiary’s strategy, but knowing when to inform, who specifically to inform and how exactly to 
do this are key characteristics of any influence the subsidiary wishes to maintain (Geppert and 
Dorrenbacher, 2014).  
 
Despite these observations, research on subsidiary influence has yet to consider how the daily 
interactions that take place between key actors at the corporate HQ-subsidiary interface provide a 
micro-level foundation for enhancing subsidiary influence. The next section introduces the micro-
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political perspective of the MNE as a lens to explore the more nuanced and fine-grained facets of 
subsidiary influence.   
 
Subsidiary micro-politics 
From a micro-political perspective, the MNE can be viewed as a political arena (Clegg et al. 2018; 
Morgan and Kristensen, 2006) in which micro–political interactions between key actors have the 
ability to create, shape and change organisational structures (Conroy, Collings and Clancy, 2017). 
Micro-politics are defined as the portfolio of daily tactics in which influence is built up and applied 
in order to extend room for further manoeuvring (Pfeffer, 1978; Winkler, 2010). Micro-politics 
are therefore an important means of exerting influence over others, or ‘influence in action’, 
through spaces of contestation or negotiation, and the individual actors involved are ‘micro-
politicians’ or ‘influencers’ (Mintzberg, 1983).  
 
Mandates changes, in terms of gains or losses, may be portrayed as critical ‘micro-events’ in the 
larger context of shifting MNE structures, triggering micro-political strategising, but this issue has 
received little attention in international strategy literature (Becker-Ritterspach et al. 2016). Equally, 
studies on the political perspective of the MNE call for further research at the micro-level by 
exploring the influence tactics individual actors use to develop the subsidiary’s mandate (Geppert 
and Dorrenbacher, 2014). Subsidiary actor’s intentions are not always directly aligned to the 
corporate agenda and individuals may have their own political objectives (Geppert et al. 2016). It 
is important to note that micro-political interactions do not only take place in formal dyadic 
relationships in a hierarchy, but are more prevalent within the informal daily interactions between 
individuals, allowing greater room for manoeuvre to pursue personal agendas (Winkler, 2010). As 
such, the micro-political perspective argues that ‘everyone is influencing everyone else’ regardless 





Using micro-politics as a lens to investigate subsidiary influence allows us to develop a much-
needed understanding of how key actors’ skills and activities influence the development of the 
subsidiary’s mandate (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016). Specifically, the micro-level 
activities by subsidiary actors in attempting to enhance their influence over corporate HQ require 
significant social and political undertakings (Clegg et al. 2018; Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014).  
 
Social and political interactions  
Subsidiaries may not necessarily need to possess valuable resources to establish influence, but they 
need to control, or have access to, the social relationships that provide these resources 
(Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016; Forsgren et al. 2005; Kostova and Roth, 2003). Structural 
changes within the MNE may provide subsidiary actors with the opportunity to create important 
‘social spaces’ for relationship building (Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014). Relationship building 
in this manner is an important part of micro-politics and often manifests in the form of establishing 
coalitions with key decision makers (Winkler, 2010). Developing an extensive interpersonal 
network of social relations in order to gather information and mobilize support when needed is an 
important antecedent to establishing influence (Ammeter et al. 2002). That political actors at the 
subsidiary level ‘may interact readily and directly’ with key decision makers is well recognised 
(Kostova and Roth, 2003: 305) but this perspective fails to address ‘how’ key subsidiary actors 
informally create or operate in social spaces on a regular basis (Ammeter et al. 2002). These social 
spaces are found in the relational structures between and among individual actors, but built 
through regular and recurrent social interactions (Baron and Markman, 2000; La Due Lake and 
Huckfeldt, 1998). Despite this, a major criticism of the micro-political perspective is that it largely 
fails to consider how exactly key actors cultivate social spaces for greater levels of social interaction 




Studies on subsidiary influence commonly assume that ‘managers of subsidiaries are better 
positioned than anyone to anticipate critical needs of corporate HQ’ (Molloy and Delany, 1998: 
12). This perspective overlooks the importance of the ‘social skill’ of individual actors as a way to 
firstly ‘gain access’ to decision makers (Baron and Markman, 2000). Social skill is important for 
understanding how patterns of social interaction are created and leveraged, as it involves the 
purposeful development of recurrent patterns in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). As such, 
social skill involves the ability to create social spaces, which are an important prerequisite to 
creating and developing social interactions (Baron and Markman, 2000). Extensive, efficacious and 
quality interactions may lead to a higher chance of subsidiary actors developing personal relations 
with corporate executives (Kostova and Roth, 2003). Social skill may be particularly relevant in the 
context of larger structural changes, and the flexibility to adapt to changes in the social hierarchy 
that lead to the development of new networks is important (Levy and Reiche, 2017). Being 
proactive during this change often requires taking self-initiated action to alter the social 
environment or challenge the status quo (Grant and Rothbard, 2013). This may involve seeking 
new information, building networks or seeking feedback, rather than waiting for external guidance 
(Thompson, 2005). Proactiveness may also involve the development of initiatives to create a more 
favourable platform for increased social interaction within these networks. Changes in formal 
structure affect the relationships that actors develop within their networks but there is very little 
understanding of how the social skill of subsidiary actors helps create and leverage important social 
interactions with corporate HQ during significant structural transitions (Kostova and Roth, 2003; 
Lynch and Mors, 2018). The ‘dark side’ of developing regular social interactions, which may lead 
to negative experiences or be perceived as a ‘waste of time’ by executives, creating distrust or 
suspicion, has also been largely ignored in the extant literature (Bouquet, Barsoux and Levy, 2015; 




Another major limitation of studies on the micro-political perspective of the MNE is that they 
overlook the importance of political skill in establishing influence (Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 
2014). Despite social skill often determining who individual actors are connected to (Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2005; Kostova and Roth, 2003), political skill determines the particular tactics that 
individuals use to influence or leverage such connections (Blass and Ferris, 2007; Cullen et al. 2015; 
Harvey and Novicevic, 2004). In the subsidiary context, political skill may involve the ability to 
gain ‘specific support’ from corporate HQ when a proposal is being presented (Molloy and Delany, 
1998). Political skill may involve effectively reinforcing particular subsidiary characteristics or 
successes so that corporate decision makers are aware of the value and relevance of these 
characteristics (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016). Those who are politically adept may be 
effective at developing a reputation for being an expert in a certain area and constantly seek to 
reinforce this (Pfeffer, 1978). However, political skill involves assertiveness and conviction (Molloy 
and Delany, 1998), but actors may risk over-promoting, over-selling or misdirecting influence 
attempts, creating negative reputational effects (Conroy and Collings, 2016). Individuals who are 
highly skilled politically may risk being perceived as self-interested or subversive if they are using 
ineffective influencing tactics (Ferris et al. 2007). How individuals use political skill to coercively 
influence decisions for their self-interest and the negative effects this may have on the rest of the 
organisation has largely been overlooked in the context of research on political skill (Zettler and 
Lang, 2015).  
 
Based on the preceding argument, it is clear that, as the MNE structure shifts to a more networked 
architecture, we need to develop a greater appreciation of how subsidiary influence is developed 
through the social and political undertakings of key subsidiary actors. As such, the main aim of 
this study is to explore how subsidiary actors use their social and political skills to augment and 





The current study is qualitative in nature as qualitative research is uniquely suited to exploring how 
social and political exchanges take place in micro-level interactions within the MNE 
(Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016). We utilised a multiple case study research design as it 
generally provides more robust and compelling evidence than a single case, allowing for the 
development of a more complete theoretical representation (Yin, 2009). Exploratory case study 
research is particularly appropriate for exploring the early stage relationship between complex and 
dynamic issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). The extant literature has 
called for more qualitative case studies in the IB field in general (Birkinshaw et al. 2011; Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2016; Welch et al. 2011) emphasising the value of case studies as an appropriate tool 
for investigating social and political dynamics in MNEs (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016; 
Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014; Levy and Reiche, 2017). As such, case studies are uniquely suited 
to opening the black box of ‘how’, ‘who’ and ‘why’ questions (Doz, 2011) in the context of 
corporate HQ-subsidiary relationships (Collings and Dick, 2011).  
 
The selection of the cases was motivated by the need to find rich evidence of social and political 
dynamics during mandate change. Therefore, 6 subsidiaries of U.S MNEs operating in Ireland 
were chosen and pseudonyms are used to provide anonymity. Cases were identified in accordance 
with theoretical sampling and selected on their suitability for extending relationships and logic 
among constructs (Yin, 2009). This sampling criteria focused on U.S. MNE subsidiaries operating 
in the medical devices industry, in a specific geographical location, the Mid-West region of Ireland, 
which have recently extended or renewed their mandates through corporate investment. Our logic 
is that the outcome of mandate development provides a context to explore subsidiary influence, 
and in particular the micro-level interactions between power actors (Dorrenbacher and 
Gammelgaard, 2016). In some instances, examples of mandate loss were also identified. All 6 
subsidiaries are major employers in their local region and all have advanced or important mandates 
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with significant experience in gaining and losing investment from corporate HQ. Therefore, we 
controlled for the types of mandates subsidiaries had in order to set the foundation for how social 
and political skills of subsidiary actors manifested in their interactions with corporate HQ. Case 
firms were chosen based on similar characteristics required to be included in our study. Yin (2009) 
terms this form of case design literal replication, in that multiple cases produce similar and more 
robust results. The cases were comparable in the sense that, rather than observing contrasting 
patterns across cases, we focused on clarification, replication and extension of emergent findings 
across the cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This form of replication logic enhances the 
validity and sharpens the focus of relationships between constructs and the underlying reasons of 
why these relationships exist (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Data collection 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were the main source of data collection. A total of 50 
interviews were carried out and of these 47 were conducted with top management across the 6 
subsidiaries. In identifying respondents for interview, we utilised purposive sampling techniques. 
We were conscious of developing breadth rather than depth and the majority of respondents held 
regional or global roles within their respective subsidiaries. We targeted subsidiary actors as 
‘corporate elites’ or ‘knowledgeable agents’ (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013), knowing that ‘the 
higher the status of the company informant interviewed the more reliable and powerful the data’ 
(Welch et al. 2002: 613). All of these interviewees were host country nationals with the exception 
of one expatriate. Three interviews were carried out with representatives from institutions in the 
local environment to provide further context. Interviews lasted between 90 to 120 minutes and 
were all conducted at the respondents’ places of work. Interviews were digitally recorded, 
transcribed verbatim, and stored in case files along with extensive interview case notes. Table 1 




INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Documentary evidence (Table 2) was collected on each case firm, through company websites, 
annual reports and press releases to provide extensive company profiles (Gibbert et al. 2008). These 
profiles aimed at capturing corporate HQ’s perspectives, which were only partially represented in 
our primary data. We sought to partially capture this perspective by asking interviewees for their 
perception of corporate HQ’s perspective. We follow other studies in assuming the high validity 
of these perceptions as many of the respondents had previously held roles at, or embarked on 
assignments to, corporate HQ within their respective MNEs (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 
2016). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Data analysis   
Data analysis was constructed along the lines of abductive reasoning, in that data were analysed in 
tandem with the data collection through a nonlinear iterative research design (Dubois and Gadde, 
2014). Matching and redirection between existing theory on micro-politics and subsidiary 
influence, and the new data being collected, allowed for the emergence of original theoretical 
constructs within the analysis process (Van Maanen, Sorensen and Mitchell, 2007). In this way, 
new conceptual insights, related to existing theories, emerged from the data, allowing for the 
creation of more refined theoretical insights as the analysis progressed (Dubois and Gadde, 2014). 
The interview protocol was ‘guided’ by theoretical frames of reference from the literature on 
subsidiary influence and micro-politics, in order to provide ‘structural signals’ (Dabos and 
Rousseau, 2004) for ‘probing’ interviewee’ thoughts. These signals formed the key questions asked 
to interviewees, aimed at qualifying the context of the subsidiary actor’s social and political 




Data from each case were collected individually and sequentially. We conducted within-case 
analysis and subsequently cross-case analysis (Yin, 2009). We developed themes and codes that 
illustrated the derivation of theoretical constructs from the data in order to enhance the reliability 
of our findings (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2016; Gioia et al. 2013). Initially, in the ‘open coding’ stage 
we identified first order codes, derived from and aligned with interviewee’s terminology on 
subsidiary influence. Second order codes were subsequently created by categorising first order 
codes and grounding them in theoretical language on subsidiary influence and micro-politics in 
particular. Finally, we developed overall theoretical aggregate themes, based on the first and second 
order codes, derived from the raw data, existing literature and emerging themes. An example of 
this coding process is represented in the following quote, ‘everything you do you are really trying 
to market the site’ (Senior Manufacturing Director MEDCO), which we coded as ‘marketing 




The following section describes the specific ways that subsidiary actors across the 6 case firms 
used their social and political skills to gain access to and subsequently influence corporate 
counterparts.  
 
Socially and politically inactive  
A number of respondents were adamant that they did not value being socially or politically active, 
believing the ‘destiny’ of their mandates was solely determined by corporate HQ. For example, 
despite SINCO being one of the top three most strategically important subsidiaries, within an 
internally competitive MNE, a number of subsidiary interviewees were not as socially or politically 
active as the subsidiary’s mandate permitted. Focusing on the execution of their existing mandate 
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and taking orders from corporate HQ was perceived by some respondents as the most effective 
way to ‘play the corporate game’. Respondents added that being too socially and politically active 
was potentially a risky approach, as they feared a negative reaction from others within the MNE if 
viewed as self-serving. SINCO was an example of a case that had recently suffered from mandate 
loss. PHARMCO was a further example of a case that was not as successful in developing its 
mandate as other cases in our study. PHARMCO’s Financial Controller suggests, ‘we would not 
necessarily go touting for business…we feel we would be stepping out of line and we would not 
like anyone else to do it’. As such, fear of negative consequences and the need to be seen as ‘good 
corporate citizens’ were major drivers for not being socially or politically active and led to 
outcomes of either mandate loss or a lack of significant mandate development compared to other 
firms. Despite this, the majority of respondents were socially and politically engaged with corporate 
HQ, resulting in both progressive and adverse outcomes to their mandates.  
 
Social navigating  
Respondents articulated the importance of being able to continuously create, maintain and develop 
spaces of social engagement with key decision makers at corporate HQ. Given the complex 
reporting lines and continuously changing social environment regularly evident within MNEs, it 
was important for subsidiary actors to draw on social skill to create greater levels of social 
engagement with key corporate decision makers. As such, social navigating involved key subsidiary 
actors leveraging their social skill to develop a platform for implementing political influence tactics. 
The importance of social navigating was driven mainly by the historical lack of social engagement 
with key decision makers in most subsidiaries. We identify a lack of necessary social skills as having 
a key impact in this regard. Subsequent changes in leadership teams have allowed respondents to 
develop more deliberate means of social engagement. The comment below outlines how this 




Back in the mid-nineties the leadership of the plant was recognised as very territorial and 
parochial and did not engage very well with corporate…there would have been an attitude 
of ‘we will sit and listen to the yanks for two days and then we will go back to what we were 
doing’. There is now much more engagement. [The subsidiary] are actively seeking support 




We define social space as a context for social interaction between key actors, which can manifest 
both formally and informally. As such, social navigating was undertaken through both formal and 
informal avenues. Formally, many subsidiary actors leveraged their global roles within the 
subsidiary, or previous expatriate assignments, to purposefully create and develop greater spaces 
of social engagement. Such global roles allowed for direct reporting lines and more open 
communication channels that are important for building relationships. As CHEMCO’s VP of 
Regulatory Affairs states, ‘we are making sure we have the right people at the right table, if you 
have a particular job it is easy to get the right people in the right space’. A willingness to undertake 
international assignments was also cited as a formal way to create more social engagement with 
corporate executives. Many of the respondents outlined how they have strategically used previous 
assignments as ‘stepping stones’ to navigate the social hierarchy within the MNE; 
 
My latest global assignment would not have been possible only for my last position. That 
position would not have been created if I had not taken the step a few years ago for the 
previous position and now we have that and we also have another management position 
where we have more ownership and responsibility (R&D Manager PHARMCO).  
 
 
Social navigating also transpired through informal channels beyond the formal mandate. 
Respondents invested significant resources and time into informally engaging with corporate HQ 
through informal interactions that are ‘not written in the charter, but that’s just the reality of it’ 
(Senior R&D Manger VASCA). Respondents were deliberate in creating informal ‘corridor 
conversations’ to ‘understand who the movers and shakers are’ (R&D Manager MEDCO) as 
‘decision making depends a lot on building your networks and communication channels if you do 
not work with these guys and meet them stimulate relationships with them…a lot of relationship 
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building is on an informal basis’ (NPD Manager CHEMCO). In other words, ‘there is a lot that 
goes on behind the scenes’ (Senior R&D Manager MEDCO), ‘so we are kind of sowing seeds 
around the place’ (Process Development Manager SINCO). An important part of how these formal 
and informal avenues were created and maintained involved social proactiveness and social 
flexibility within the changing social hierarchy of the MNE.  
 
Proactiveness 
In most of our cases, respondents indicated the importance of being socially proactive in 
navigating informal channels of engagement. In this sense, social proactiveness is defined as the 
development of initiatives to create a more favourable platform for increased social engagement 
with key decision makers. Respondents cited how they regularly attempted to create more 
opportunities to visit corporate HQ as well as invite executives to the subsidiary. As noted by the 
Engineering Manager at PHARMCO, ‘you have got to get over there, it is invaluable, plus having 
them here, it is about taking the time to get to know people’. Managers would deliberately send 
subsidiary ‘champions’ on these visits that had the capacity to build relationships and ‘involve 
people in what we were doing’. A major motivation for this approach was that respondents knew 
they were not as close geographically to corporate HQ as other subsidiaries and perceived they 
needed to be more ‘well connected’ socially as they feared their mandates were vulnerable to 
depletion if they were not continuously searching for opportunities to engage with decision 
makers. The HR Manager at MEDCO noted that, ‘you have to be seen over there. You will lose 
touch, if I wasn’t over there I would just be a name that’s in a remote location doing some good 
work but now we have a name and a relationship and its very different’. Interestingly, respondents 
in some cases noted that being socially proactive often leads to opportunities for other subsidiary 
actors being promoted to more global roles across the MNE or at corporate HQ. The quote below 




We are looking to improve the relationship. As the group are getting bigger, everybody kind 
of calls me, so one of the things that is very important is that promoting the new people, so 
getting the guys to travel and getting them to meet their peers and the senior people over 
there [corporate HQ] so that they will get a flavour (R&D Manager CHEMCO). 
 
Flexibility 
Being flexible in adapting to continuously changing structures so that further levels of social 
engagement could be maintained and developed was an important part of social navigating. 
Flexibility in this regard involved having the ability to adapt to a changing social environment by 
maintaining existing social relationships or creating new social relationships. Respondents outlined 
that their respective MNEs have become more complicated due to varied reporting lines or 
decision structures and continuous changes to key personnel. As a result, social relationships they 
had built up with key decision makers may be disrupted or risk becoming obsolete if key individuals 
left their roles or were replaced with others who may have their own political motivations. As an 
example, respondents at CHEMCO are heavily dependent on the close social relationship they 
have built up over time with their CEO and the subsidiary may be vulnerable to any change in this 
regard. Other respondents cited how changes in executive personnel have negatively affected their 
ability to tap into social relationships they had developed over time. The following comments are 
indicative of these insights:  
 
Long term [the CEO] will not be part of the executive management so who replaces him 
and how the organization is going to be managed is going to be one of the key challenges, 
so positioning ourselves so that we operate irrespective of who is at the helm and have the 
capability to adapt quickly (VP of Regulatory Affairs CHEMCO). 
 
When I took over my first job, the VP I was exposed to…he and I had a great 
relationship…he was supportive of building up a core in [the subsidiary]. When he left the 
next VP was German and he had no problem with wearing black, red and yellow1 and 
everyone knew that (R&D Director for VASCA). 
 
                                                        
1 This is a euphemism for saying that the German VP was nationalistic in his approach and was 
biased toward the German subsidiaries in the MNE.  
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Flexibility is also important in maintaining social engagement with key decision makers particularly 
when acquisitions occur. Acquired companies were frequently rationalised across the MNE and 
often resulted in mandate extensions for subsidiaries. Subsidiary actors realised that being ‘well 
connected’ to key decision makers would provide them with a timely platform to potentially benefit 
from this restructuring. As such, respondents were extremely conscious that the social 
relationships they built up were key for taking advantage of acquisition opportunities. As the 
Engineering Manager at PHARMCO notes; 
When there is an acquisition then you are the number one name on the senior management 
team’s list or when they are going to develop a new product and make a decision on where 
to put it, you want to be the first person there for it.  
 
Social stability   
Some respondents tended to overuse their social skill in certain instances and eventually it led to a 
form of social imbalance in the subsidiary management team. For example, the VP at 
HEALTHCO stated that too much ‘plámásing’2 happened in the past in that the subsidiary had 
been criticised by corporate HQ and other subsidiaries for ‘overdoing it’ when socialising with 
corporate HQ: 
 
When people came to [Ireland] one of the problems we had was they [corporate HQ] would 
always complain about the journey from Dublin…so I started to get the plant guys to lay on 
taxis for the Americans who would be tired when they arrive in so they do not want to drive 
on the wrong side of the road. Taxis at that time were about 300 euros so I said let’s organize 
taxis for them even if they are only technicians, who cares.  
 
Respondents stated that a drawback of being more socially engaged within the MNE was that it 
led to changes to personnel in the subsidiary management team. A number of respondents talked 
about maintaining a ‘social stability’ within the subsidiary management team; ‘it is very much a 
global team but there is a concentration of that team now based in [the subsidiary]. It is important 
                                                        
2 This is an Irish colloquial term for ingratiating or flattery behaviour.  
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from [the subsidiary] standpoint to have everybody operating out of here’ (VP MEDCO). As the 
subsidiaries’ mandates became more global and interconnected, having ‘people with no skin in the 
game’ operating of out of the subsidiary was considered a major threat. In this sense respondents 
favoured local subsidiary actors holding global roles in the subsidiary, but they were protective 
against ‘outsiders’ being expatriated to the subsidiary. Some respondents were extremely assertive 
in combating against any potential changes to personnel and protecting key roles within the 
subsidiary. As the Plant Manager at HEALTHCO stated, ‘when you have non [Irish] nationals 
moving into plant positions they have a different agenda, of personal gain and that could be the 
beginning of the end’.  
 
An important theme that emerged was that although social skill was used to establish greater levels 
of social engagement with corporate executives, respondents were cognisant that this would not 
necessarily lead to influence. As the Director of R&D for MEDCO noted, ‘those contacts are at 
the right table, and half a connection back to here. It is beneficial, but the site has to be able to 
show the benefit to these contacts and they will then help drive that’. In this regard, it was evident 
that subsidiary actors concomitantly needed to use their political skill to exert influence over 
corporate executives. 
 
Political manoeuvring   
A number of respondents actively engaged in political manoeuvring, which involved leveraging 
political skill to implement specific influence tactics such as targeting, showcasing and framing 
when interacting when corporate decision makers. SINCO’s Process Development Manager 
outlines the nature of this political manoeuvring; 
 
It is pure politics, it is brutal. People nodding and winking all the time. We are kind of openly 
admitting to playing games in the multinational arena. We have all these corporate rules, 






Respondents used ‘targeting’ tactics to influence particular corporate executives with certain 
projects, through key functions in specific ways. Therefore, we define targeting as committing 
time, resources and effort into developing specific initiatives, products, projects or functions. 
Interestingly, respondents targeted products that they believe the corporate HQ has not effectively 
developed or failed to develop in the past, as the VP of Process Development at SINCO states, 
‘sometimes we will start to develop a process that has been tried in [corporate HQ] and we feel 
that through either our own knowledge or education that it might be better to use a different 
technology’. Political skill was also targeted through certain subsidiary functions, mainly R&D 
operations, as these are valuable and constantly shifting mandates within most of the subsidiaries;  
 
The political domain in managing R&D is huge. You cannot expect to manage R&D in an 
offshore context without being politically acute. Especially when you are fighting the culture 
of ‘it should only be done in the U.S.’. In order to overcome that the political skills of the 
R&D organisation need to be quite significant. People like myself and [two other subsidiary 
managers] need to be very tuned into that (R&D Director VASCA).  
 
Targeting also involved identifying and leveraging the preferences of key contacts in corporate HQ 
that were already established through social navigating. Knowing the specific preferences of key 
decision makers or ‘gatekeepers’ was a critical targeting tactic, for example, one respondent noted 
that their new CEO was very much focused on ‘cost saving’, whereas another respondent noted 
their CEO wanted to develop a new ‘talent management’ system. Both subsequently targeted their 
efforts to developing initiatives around those particular preferences. As such, although social 
navigating was about developing greater levels of engagement and interaction with key decision 
makers, targeting in this sense was knowing exactly what the preferences or ‘hot buttons’ of these 
‘influencers’ were and subsequently targeting resources toward the creation and development of 
specific initiatives that addressed these preferences. Respondents were skilled at adapting their 
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targeting tactics to the preferences of these gatekeepers stating ‘you have people that are more 
political than others’ (Plant Manager PHARMCO). In addition to targeting, respondents 
channelled their political skill through showcasing and framing tactics. 
 
Showcasing success 
Political skill was channelled through influence tactics of showcasing success where respondents 
made corporate executives aware of the specific activities or initiatives that were successfully 
developed in the subsidiary. For example, ‘everything you do you are really trying to market the 
site and make sure you are creating the right impression’ (Senior Manufacturing Director 
MEDCO). Respondents emphasised showcasing their success through annual and quarterly 
reviews or ad-hoc visits, and subsidiary actors would ‘not be shy’ in showcasing prototypes or 
making corporate HQ aware of new initiatives. Respondents mentioned that it was important that 
the subsidiary was ‘prepared for it [corporate HQ visit], make sure if there was a new initiative that 
you had that strategically placed’ (Financial Controller PHARMCO). Respondents pointed to 
particular presentations they did with corporate and the importance of the detail and research 
beforehand: 
 
If there is an exciting topic we would do a couple of slides on, just to give them a bit more 
comfort. Getting validation or positive feedback from clinicians is also good before we go 
into these meetings. Being able to communicate that is very important and they are aware of 
it. And we can get focus from that (Senior R&D Manager VASCA). 
 
Furthermore, respondents politically targeted difficult or complex projects, that other subsidiaries 
or even corporate executives would not undertake, but subsequently showcased the success from 
executing these projects as the basis for gaining further investment. This was a targeted showcasing 




[Corporate HQ] made it out to be an absolutely monstrous project, which it was not, 
corporate bought the whole thing…it came in on time and on schedule and corporate were 
drooling at this great execution and in reality it was easier…for the plant here it was a huge 
feather in our cap. We subsequently won a massive project that is going on now in R&D 
and it is the biggest project in the corporation (Process Development Manager SINCO).  
 
Framing problems 
An important part of subsidiary actors’ political skill was how they framed problems at the 
subsidiary to corporate executives. A number of the subsidiaries in one of our cases had previously 
faced a product recall that ‘dented corporate confidence’ (MD SINCO), and eventually lead to the 
partial loss of a mandate at the VASCA subsidiary. Hence, subsidiary actors became even more 
politically active when problems or setbacks arose as they were acutely aware that ‘you are only as 
good as your last mistake’ (VP Process Development SINCO). As such, respondents used their 
political skill to frame problems in different ways. Some politically naive respondents outlined how 
they managed problems ‘under the radar’ but when they escalated and corporate HQ were 
eventually made aware, it resulted in tensions. Other politically savvy respondents stated that it 
was important not to remain silent and ‘sit on problems’ or issues and instead disclose them early, 
but more importantly to frame them with a plan on how they may be solved:  
 
It is really about not just saying we have a problem, but about saying we have a problem and 
this is what we are doing about it. You advise them [corporate HQ] about an upcoming issue 
so you also have your own plan so you want to give them confidence that everything that 
can be done about it is being done, you do it in a way that promotes the confidence that it 
is a safe pair of hands (VP Director of Manufacturing MEDCO).  
 
Framing in a relative sense was particularly useful when there were problems at other competing 
subsidiaries that were not dealt with effectively as it allowed subsidiary actors to use this as an 
opportunity. As the Plant Manager at HEALTHCO states, ‘where we have done better than say 
some of the other plants, they have tended to have surprises, nasty surprises, financial surprises or 




Strategic repositioning of the subsidiary mandate  
An important outcome of how subsidiary actors leveraged their social and political skill was the 
deliberate strategy to ‘reposition’ the subsidiary’s mandate over time within the MNE. Strategic 
repositioning involved the continuous social navigating and political manoeuvring of subsidiary 
actors in order to incrementally develop the mandate up ‘the strategic staircase’ (R&D Director 
MEDCO). In some ways, repositioning the mandate was not a straightforward development 
process driven by corporate investment or a deliberate subsidiary plan, but more an unstructured 
intermittent activity that was dependent on how skilled subsidiary actors were in ‘freeing up space’ 
by, ‘moving higher value products in’ and ‘lower value products out’ (Plant Manager PHARMCO). 
This often took place in the context of skilled subsidiary actors anticipating and taking advantage 
of significant structural changes across the MNE to eventually reposition the subsidiary’s mandate 
at the higher end of the value chain. The NPD Manager at MEDCO articulates how this strategic 
repositioning worked, ‘it is difficult to know what is coming down the road, it could be a major 
investment or a major cut, so you have to position your base broad enough…you want to be in a 
position when that opportunity arises’. 
 
Most subsidiaries had advanced mandates and as a result reached full capacity in terms of physical 
space, so bringing in more R&D from corporate HQ meant firstly having to illustrate that they 
had the physical space to perform the R&D activities. Interestingly, in this context, subsidiary 
actors in global roles leveraged their political skill to strategically reposition the subsidiary’s 
mandate within the MNE, often at the expense of the rest of the MNE. For example, a number 
of respondents outlined how they had the opportunity to influence significant investment 
decisions by altering the overall structure of the MNE, securing long term investment into the 
subsidiary and ultimately repositioning the mandate. In contrast, respondents in other subsidiaries 
(VASCA) failed to leverage their political skill in this way, and this political naivety contributed to 
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the loss of their subsidiary’s mandate at the time. The two quotes below are indicative of these 
contrasting examples: 
 
I have moved four or five hundred jobs out of here to Mexico…some people thought I was 
crazy moving stuff to Mexico they thought it might jeopardise the business. The Irish 
subsidiary now realise that we cannot compete with Mexico anymore from a cost structure 
point of view but that we have to use them so that our overall cost structure looks better. 
Outsourcing the labour intensive activities has helped secure what the Irish subsidiary has 
left (VP MEDCO).   
 
The decision to close the subsidiary was very much one of timing and politics. In my 
discussion with corporate they were asking me why I would not close the R&D facility in 
the U.S. and move it to [Ireland]. So, I had all the Americans asking me to close down the 
R&D facility in their own back yard and ship it to [Ireland]. In reality what I wanted to do 
at the time was close down Germany and Switzerland and create two poles of R&D between 
[Ireland] and [corporate HQ] (R&D Director VASCA).  
 
Based on the above findings we define social skill as the ability to continuously create, maintain 
and develop spaces of social engagement with key decision makers. This involves being proactive 
and flexible while maintaining social stability in the subsidiary management team. Political skill is 
defined as the ability to leverage social spaces by developing specific influence tactics. How these 
skills are leveraged may impact the strategic repositioning of the subsidiary’s mandate within the 
MNE. Figure 1 includes our data structure along with illustrative quotes for each of the above 
arguments. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
DISCUSSION  
The significant shift from a hierarchical to a networked MNE has challenged how the subsidiary 
manages its changing relationship with corporate HQ and has created a ‘high stakes’ political 
contestation in the struggle to develop and maintain influence (Egelhoff and Wolf, 2017; Levy and 
Reiche, 2017). Despite calls to explore how the subsidiary can cultivate greater influence in this 
context, extant research has largely failed to address the ongoing micro-level interactions that take 
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place on a daily basis between key actors at the corporate HQ-subsidiary interface (Geppert and 
Dorrenbacher, 2014; O’Brien et al. 2018; Pla‐Barber et al. 2017). By exploring how subsidiary actors 
use their social and political skills to augment and enrich subsidiary influence in the context of 
mandate change, our study makes two important theoretical contributions. First, drawing insights 
from a micro-political perspective of the MNE (Clegg et al. 2018; Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 
2016; Geppert et al. 2016; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006), we provide 
a more nuanced micro-level understanding of subsidiary influence, by illuminating the importance 
of the social and political dimensions of subsidiary influence (Kostova and Roth, 2003; Levy and 
Reiche, 2017). We argue that subsidiary influence needs to be understood independently, at least 
in part, from the formal resources the subsidiary possesses and structures it operates in, and more 
so through the social and political undertakings of key actors in the context of mandate change. 
In doing so, we answer calls to explore further ‘how power is socially enacted and how political 
manoeuvring is grounded in micro-level interactions’ at the corporate HQ-subsidiary interface 
(Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014: 231). Second, and more specifically, we illustrate that a 
subsidiary can augment and enrich its influence in the context of mandate change by channelling 
the social and political skills of key subsidiary actors in particular ways. Our findings illustrate how 
social skill allows subsidiary actors to continuously create, maintain and develop spaces of social 
engagement with key decision makers, whereas political skill leverages social spaces to develop 
specific influence tactics in the form of targeting, showcasing and framing. In doing so, we answer 
calls for a refined conceptualisation of the nuanced differences between how social and political 
skills are used (Baron and Markman, 2000; Blass and Ferris, 2007; Cullen et al. 2015; Ferris et al. 
2007; Harvey and Novicevic, 2004) and illuminate the concomitant value of these skills in the 
context of subsidiary influence. A major contribution of our study comes in the form of a typology 
of subsidiary actor influence roles, outlined in the next section. 
 
Typology of subsidiary actor influence roles  
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Based on our findings, we have identified four particular types of subsidiary actor influence roles 
and we have categorised these as; recluse, political animal, socialite and strategic influencer. We 
define these roles by the degree of social navigating and political manoeuvring that subsidiary 
actors undertake. Social navigating involves the way in which subsidiary actors leverage their social 
skill to develop a platform for implementing political influence tactics. Political manoeuvring 
involves the way in which subsidiary actors leverage their political skill to implement particular 
influence tactics when engaging with corporate decision makers. Figure 2 presents a typology of 
these roles. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Our study identifies Recluse subsidiary actors, who are involved in low levels of social navigating 
and political manoeuvring as they are neither socially nor politically active and nor do they value 
engaging with or influencing corporate executives. Our findings show that even though the 
subsidiary’s mandate may allow for autonomy and freedom to manoeuvre, recluse subsidiary actors 
are risk averse for various reasons. This may prove less prosperous or even destructive for the 
subsidiary’s mandate. As such, although recluse actors may on occasion have the necessary social 
and political skills, they do not proactively draw on these skills to pursue the subsidiary agenda. 
They do not partake in political manoeuvring as they are fearful of being viewed as self-serving by 
corporate HQ or others. Equally, they are not involved in social navigating as they are often 
deterred by complex reporting lines and changing structures within the MNE. Further exploring 
the reasons why subsidiary actors that have the skills to develop the subsidiary’s mandate, but fail 
to do so, is an interesting area that would address the lacuna of empirical work on the devolution 




Political animals are those subsidiary actors that are highly involved in political manoeuvring and 
channel their political skill through specific influence tactics of targeting, showcasing and framing 
when engaging with key corporate decision makers. In borrowing insights from micro-politics 
(Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2016; Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014), our findings illustrate 
that political animals target their political efforts through key functions, initiatives or individual 
preferences and commit resources, time and effort into influencing corporate gatekeepers. We 
build on studies that show that subsidiary power resides within specific functions (Mudambi et al. 
2014), but illuminate how specific influence tactics such as targeting, showcasing and framing may 
be channelled through the R&D mandate in particular due to the constant changes and desire for 
corporate executives to maintain control of their advanced operations.  
 
Political animals use their political skill to target difficult projects at corporate HQ and participate 
regularly in showcasing specific successes in executing these projects. We build on earlier studies 
that argue keeping corporate HQ informed of the subsidiary’s activities may be an important way 
to overcome corporate HQ bounded rationality (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008b; Ciabuschi et al. 
2011; Conroy and Collings, 2016). Specifically, we expand on these insights by showing how 
targeted showcasing is an effective micro-political influence tactic. Regularly identifying and 
‘framing’, rather than hiding, subsidiary problems in particular ways to corporate HQ, and crucially 
developing plans to solve these problems is an important part of political manoeuvring. Being 
open and transparent when problems arise but subsequently framing them to corporate executives 
in a way that the problems may be solved with a clear plan is a subtle but influential political tactic. 
These insights contribute to the emerging political perspective of the MNE (Clegg et al. 2018; 
Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014; Geppert et al. 2016) and add a micro-level dimension to 
subsidiary influence studies by illuminating how influence is effectively carried out through the 
political targeting strategies of key subsidiary actors rather than haphazard broad-based influence 
approaches. More studies need to consider the specific nuances of political manoeuvring for 
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understanding subsidiary influence in the context of a changing corporate HQ-subsidiary 
relationship (Conroy et al. 2017; Levy and Reiche, 2017).  
 
Political animals may however use their political skill in ways that negatively impact the subsidiary’s 
mandate. We find that as subsidiary actors take on global roles, their decisions have the ability to 
shape and ‘dictate’ the overall structure of the MNE. Politically astute actors are more likely to use 
their political skill in ways that benefit both the subsidiary and the wider MNE. However, politically 
subversive actors often fail to identify the dual advantages of these opportunities. This political 
subversion involves hiding problems or not disclosing issues until too late due overconfidence that 
a problem can be solved in isolation, or a belief that the corporate immune system may refuse the 
development of certain initiatives. As such, we address calls for further work on how self-interest 
and opportunism may impact the corporate HQ-subsidiary relationship (Cavanagh et al. 2017; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004) by illuminating how key subsidiary actors may subversively abuse 
their political skill to benefit the subsidiary’s agenda at the expense of the MNE. These insights 
also address shortcomings in considering the negative aspects of using political skill (Zettler and 
Lang, 2015) and how the politicising process affects the subsidiary’s mandate (Birkinshaw and 
Ridderstrale, 1999). Further work is needed on how the disaggregation of corporate HQ 
responsibilities to key subsidiary actors may impact the overall structure of the MNE and create 
further complexity in maintaining subsidiary influence (Levy and Reiche, 2017; O’Brien et al. 2018; 
Pla-Barber et al. 2017).   
 
Socialites are those subsidiary actors that are involved in high levels of social navigating, leveraging 
their social skill to create, maintain and develop spaces of social engagement that are a crucial 
platform for implementing political influence tactics. We illuminate how significant changes to the 
social hierarchy of the MNE may provide subsidiary actors with the opportunity to cultivate 
further social spaces for informally engaging key decisions makers. This insight answers calls to 
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explore how subsidiary actors navigate the changing social hierarchy of the MNE (Levy and 
Reiche, 2017), by revealing how the social skill of subsidiary actors is an often overlooked 
requirement for ‘gaining access’ to decision makers at corporate HQ (Kostova and Roth, 2003; La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). Further, socialites are socially flexible, with an ability to adapt to 
changes across the MNE, such as increasingly complex reporting lines, more integrated decision 
structures or changes in personnel. These changes increase the importance of socialites becoming 
‘social chameleons’ that are continuously adapting (Baron and Markman, 2000). Socialites are also 
highly socially proactive (Grant and Rothbard, 2013; Thompson, 2005) in actively promoting the 
capabilities of other subsidiary actors in order to develop informal relationships with corporate 
executives. As such, in order for subsidiary actors to be ‘better positioned’ than anyone to interact 
with and anticipate the critical needs of corporate decision makers (Kostova and Roth, 2003; 
Molloy and Delany, 1998), our findings emphasise the need to be socially proactive and flexible to 
continuously develop greater levels of social engagement.  
 
Interestingly, our study reveals that socialites may inadvertently use their social skill in ways that 
exposes the subsidiary management team to changes in personnel, leading to key actors being 
exported from the subsidiary or strategic roles being filled by expatriates. Socialites in our case 
firms cited the socially homogenous nature and social stability of the subsidiary management team 
as a valuable condition for developing the subsidiary’s mandate. Increasing informal social 
engagement with corporate HQ may lead to the threat of ‘outsiders’ being expatriated to the 
subsidiary, who may not be committed to the subsidiary’s agenda. Although this may be a positive 
for the MNE, subsidiary actors viewed this as a threat to the development of the subsidiary’s 
mandate over time, as it disrupts the social stability of the subsidiary management team. As such, 
a drawback for subsidiary actors being overly involved in social navigating with corporate HQ is 
that the subsidiary becomes an attractive location for other actors within the MNE to develop 
their individual careers. These insights contribute to studies seeking to explain the ‘dark side’ of 
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socialising (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Labianca and Brass, 2006; Liebeskind et al. 1996) by 
showing how using social skill to develop increased patterns of interaction may disrupt the social 
stability of the subsidiary management team. Equally, there is a danger of over-socialising to the 
point of resemblance with corporate HQ if too many expatriate managers become stationed in the 
subsidiary. In other words, we find that overly extensive socialisation or interaction with corporate 
HQ may dilute the subsidiary’s uniqueness over time. 
 
Strategic influencers are subsidiary actors that are involved in high levels of social navigating and 
political manoeuvring. These actors leverage the concomitant value of social skill and political skill 
to augment and enrich influence over corporate HQ. Strategic influencers use their social skill to 
develop greater levels of social engagement with corporate HQ while concomitantly using their 
political skill to develop influence tactics of targeting, showcasing and framing. The increased 
interaction that results from greater social engagement allows strategic influencers to channel their 
political skill for the development of both the subsidiary and the MNE. Strategic influencers are 
socially and politically astute so that they avoid disrupting the social stability of the subsidiary while 
also avoiding being viewed as self-serving. Strategic influencers are proactive and flexible, and use 
targeting, framing and showcasing approaches, which over time leads to a strategic repositioning 
of the subsidiary’s mandate. Strategic repositioning in this regard is defined as a continuous process 
of social navigating and political manoeuvring undertaken by key subsidiary actors to gradually and 
subtly reposition the subsidiary’s mandate in the corporate value chain.  
 
Interestingly, we find that strategic repositioning was not a straightforward development process 
driven by corporate investment or a rational subsidiary plan. In contrast to most previous studies 
on mandate change (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), we identify strategic repositioning as an 
unstructured intermittent activity that was dependent on how skilled subsidiary actors were at 
‘freeing up space’ for higher value-added products. As such, repositioning of a subsidiary mandate 
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is similar to the idea of ‘upgrading’ (Burger et al. 2017), but ‘upgrading’ foregrounds the subsidiary’s 
formal resources, whereas our findings point to the importance of continuous socio-political 
interactions with corporate decision makers in incrementally readjusting the fluid position of the 
subsidiary’s mandate in the context of a changing MNE structure. This contributes to a more 
nuanced and fine-grained understanding of mandate change by explicating how subsidiary 
influence is not solely determined by the formal resources it possess but more so by the particular 
micro-level skills that strategic influencers draw on and deploy. In doing so, we argue that current 
studies have largely overlooked the fact that the subsidiary’s mandate is characterised by significant 
levels of variability and ambiguity (see Alfoldi et al. 2017) given the changes in its relationship with 
corporate HQ and the resulting political contestations. Interestingly, we also illustrate how partial 
mandate loss for the subsidiary may not be zero sum game as it may lead to greater scope to attract 
investment in responsibilities that lead to a higher value-added mandate. In strategically 
repositioning a subsidiary’s mandate higher up the value chain, a partial loss to lower value-added 
responsibilities may be a strategic necessity in the short term. As such, the parallel effects of social 
skill and political skill of key subsidiary actors are central to augment and enrich influence in the 
context of strategically repositioning the subsidiary’s mandate.  
 
We acknowledge several limitations of the current study and point to opportunities for future 
research. We are aware that a case study approach may limit the statistical generalisability of the 
study (Yin, 2009). However, in line with the tradition of qualitative research, our aim was to 
generalise to theory as opposed to seeking generalisability in a more positivistic sense (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). This form of ‘analytical generalisability’ was achieved by providing a clear 
rationale for the case study selection with ample details of the cases and giving a reasoned 
appreciation for sampling choices (Gibbert et al. 2008). Our study explored the subsidiary 
relationship with corporate HQ but further work should focus on the importance of the 
subsidiary-to-subsidiary relationship and the impact this relationship has on subsidiary influence. 
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Empirical research should further explore the importance of the subsidiary actor in terms of the 
changing roles and identities they develop as they acquire and develop more advanced mandates. 
Such research could explore subsidiary influence incorporating theoretical insights from upper 
echelons theory and resource dependence theory. Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore 
how subsidiary actors, operating in boundary spanning roles, act as high-level intermediaries in 
balancing global and local power tensions. Studies should explore further how both hierarchical 
and networked-based structures may co-exist and the explicit impact that regional and divisional 
HQs have on the corporate HQ-subsidiary relationship. Although our study focused on the social 
and political skills of subsidiary actors, future research could explore other important skills and 
characteristics of those individuals with more work needed from a micro-foundations perspective.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This study provides a nuanced and fine-grained micro-level perspective of subsidiary influence. 
Social skill is used to continuously create, maintain and develop spaces of social engagement with 
key decision makers, whereas political skill leverages these social spaces by developing specific 
influence tactics in the form of targeting, showcasing and framing. As such, social skill and political 
skill are complementary micro-level factors for subsidiary actors that lead to a strategic 
repositioning of the subsidiary’s mandate. Ultimately, effectively navigating the social hierarchy of 
the MNE provides a platform for ‘taking aim’ and executing political manoeuvring tactics.  
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Table 1: Interviewee participants  
HEALTHCO MEDCO SINCO  VASCA  CHEMCO PHARMCO 
- Managing 
Director 





- R&D Manager 






- Vice President 
- R&D Director  
- Senior R&D 
Manager (x2) 
- NPD Manager 
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Table 2: Case descriptions  
- Senior HR 
Manager 
- HR Manager 
- Manufacturing 
Manager 
- VP Director of 
Manufacturing 
- VP Global 
Vascular 
Operations 





























































































































Figure 2: Subsidiary actor influence roles 
 
 
1. Political Animal 
 
 Targeting, showcasing, framing 
 Pushing subsidiary agenda at 
expense of overall MNE 
 
2. Strategic Influencer  
 
 Politically and socially astute 
 Flexible and proactive but 
targets, showcases and frames 





 Not politically or socially active 
 Deterred by social complexity 




 Proactive and flexible  
 Values informal engagement and 
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